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Quantum Hash You Did Something Wrong. Please Try Again Later!

Dr. Brian LaMacchia, Distinguished Engineer

Distinguished Engineer Dr. Brian LaMacchia. Photography by Maryatt Photography

Episode 38, Baronial 22, 2018

You know those people who work backside the scenes to make sure nothing bad happens to you, and if they're really good, you never know who they are because nil bad happens to you? Well, come across one of those people. Dr. Brian LaMacchia is a Distinguished Engineer and he heads up the Security and Cryptography Group at Microsoft Research. It's his job to make certain – using upwardly-to-the-minute math – that y'all're safe and secure online, both now, and in the post-breakthrough earth to come.

Today, Dr. LaMacchia gives us an inside look at the world of cryptography and the number theory behind it, explains what happens when good algorithms get bad, and tells us why, even though cryptographically relevant breakthrough computers are still decades away, we need to start developing quantum-resistant algorithms right now.

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Episode transcript

Brian LaMacchia: Nosotros even so don't really have large quantum computers. We have very tiny toy ones. But from being able to demonstrate theoretically that if a new key model of computation showed upwardly, that it would change all of our assumptions, that's withal another example of how we have to constantly call up about what an attacker has available, and if the attacker's resources all of a sudden modify, that means they tin can practice more.

Host: Y'all're listening to the Microsoft Research Podcast, a show that brings you closer to the cutting-edge of technology enquiry and the scientists behind it. I'chiliad your host, Gretchen Huizinga.

Host: Yous know those people who work backside the scenes to brand certain nothing bad happens to y'all, and if they're really skillful, you never know who they are considering null bad happens to you? Well, meet one of those people. Dr. Brian LaMacchia is a Distinguished Engineer and he heads upwards the Security and Cryptography Group at Microsoft Research. Information technology's his job to make sure – using up-to-the-minute math – that yous're prophylactic and secure online, both now, and in the post-quantum earth to come.

Today, Dr. LaMacchia gives us an within look at the earth of cryptography and the number theory behind it, explains what happens when good algorithms go bad, and tells us why, fifty-fifty though cryptographically relevant quantum computers are however decades away, nosotros need to start developing quantum-resistant algorithms right now. That and much more than on this episode of the Microsoft Enquiry Podcast.

(music plays)

Host: Brian LaMacchia, welcome to the podcast.

Brian LaMacchia: Thanks, pleasure to be hither.

Host: Y'all're a distinguished engineer at Microsoft Research, and you head the security and cryptography team here, which you lot've chosen the company's heart of excellence for cryptography. What does your grouping practice? What are the big questions you're request, the big problems you lot're tackling? What gets you up in the morning?

Brian LaMacchia: We are, as I said, the Center of Cryptographic Inquiry and Development for the company. We focus on the hardest problems that the company has that somehow involve cryptography, encryption, digital signatures, things similar that. We started a decade ago, as a little cryptographic tools squad, looking for places within the corporate research and development group where we could add value. And we tackled security problems and cryptographic problems for what was so grid computing and became cloud computing, our information centers and security problems all over the identify. But for the final iii years, we've been focused on this primary work on the upcoming threat of quantum computers, if they're successful. But and then nosotros also do piece of work on other security problems. We spend a lot of time working on the security of Internet of Things devices, and how do nosotros brand sure that devices inside your abode can't be manipulated. We also – I have a member of my team who spends a lot of time on election security and how exercise you lot verified voting and what, how tin can we bring the best in cryptographic research to end-to-terminate verifiable elections?

Host: Well, let'south do a little bit of a level set as we offset here, nearly the field of cryptography. Can you give u.s. a brief history of cryptography?

Brian LaMacchia: Sure. So, cryptography is the scientific discipline of data encryption. And information technology actually goes back to ancient times. We know that the Romans used very simple forms of cyphers. The Caesar cypher was used to transport information around. And cryptography, traditionally, was in the military field. And for the longest time, it was what we call, in the field, symmetric fundamental cryptography. That is, if you and I wanted to exchange secret letters, nosotros would agree on a hugger-mugger password or a configuration of a mechanical device or something that nosotros used to perform encryption. And then I would use that secret to encrypt data to you. You would become the naught text, the encrypted information, and you'd use that same surreptitious to decrypt information technology, so we have the aforementioned symmetric shared secret primal. And of course, in the 20th Century, cryptography started being used more and more to protect wireless communications, right? To protect radio. This is… about famously was used in Globe War 2 by all sides to protect radio communications. And your listeners probably all know the story of the German Enigma machine, which was a mechanical encryption device, which was broken. Initial research washed by Shine mathematicians, and then information technology moved to Bletchley Park and the British did a whole bunch of work under Turing and broke the Enigma and therefore learned information in secret about encrypted communications. All of that'southward within the realm of the shared cardinal model. And then there was a quantum for what was called public key cryptography. And the difference in public key is, each of us who wants to communicate has a pair of keys that are mathematically related – a individual central and a public key – and 1 of those keys y'all can release to the world. And so, if I want to encrypt something to you, I get become your public key and I encrypt it to your public key, but I can't decrypt information technology with your public key. You can decrypt with your private key that matches mathematically, and the aforementioned is true for me. And in that location's a variant of that, which is the digital signature problem, which is, I can employ a private one-half to digitally sign a message that anybody tin verify information technology could accept only come from me. And we apply both of those technologies today. Every time y'all open up a secure connection in your browser to a website, and that'south an https connection, you're doing an encryption and digital signature operation so no nefarious characters can learn your credit card number or the electronic mail you're typing if you're talking to a web email, something like that.

Host: Let's talk virtually algorithms. Most people accept them for granted, and may even be blithely unaware that algorithms are running their lives right at present in many, many ways. And I bet if yous asked anyone on the street, does math have an expiration or sell by date, or tin can an algorithm go bad, they'd just look at you like y'all're foreign. But you've said all cryptographic algorithms weaken, degrade, or break over fourth dimension.

Brian LaMacchia: That's correct.

Host: Talk about that.

Brian LaMacchia: Okay. So, unlike many other parts of information science and computer programming, cryptographic algorithms, which are number theory at their heart, naturally degrade over time as we larn more about how to attack them, and as nosotros assume that our attackers have more than compute power bachelor to them. So, we form algorithms based on security levels: how much piece of work do we think an attacker has to put in to intermission an algorithm? And as we learn more over fourth dimension, the security level degrades. And algorithms that we remember are okay today are not okay tomorrow. And that's really important when you lot're writing an application or a security protocol or a figurer system, to understand that the algorithms you lot're dependent upon today are going to have to change, and you lot can't just utilise them for the hereafter. It doesn't necessarily have a "sell by" date on information technology, but we are constantly trying to predict what an attacker can do. And sometimes, it's just more compute power being bachelor. And sometimes at that place'due south an bookish result that, all suddenly, changes our agreement of number theory. I guess the other thing to add is, sometimes we get a prediction of when an algorithm is going to break. Like, we will see a series of work done in academia where the attacks will come up forth and they volition make further and further progress until something breaks catastrophically. Sometimes we don't get a heads upward. I tin can give you two stories on that, if you'd like stories.

Host: I would. I like stories, and I bet our listeners exercise also.

Brian LaMacchia: Okay, and so a cryptographic hash function is a function that takes any corporeality of input and hashes information technology down to a stock-still digest size. And for a long time, we used one chosen Medico-5, which was invented by Ron Rivest, a Professor Rivest MIT, the R in the RSA algorithm. And we all thought information technology was secure. And in 2004, at the annual US Crypto Briefing, Professor Xiaoyun Wang from China got upwards and demonstrated ii letters that had the same MD-5 hash value. And you're not supposed to ever exist able to do that. And she did that. And the fact that she could practice that meant that the primal security holding of that hash function was no longer whatsoever good. And therefore, we had to movement to some other hash part, because that one was busted, equally far equally nosotros intendance from a cryptographic perspective.

Host: But you didn't know that going in?

Brian LaMacchia: We didn't know that going in, just we knew when we heard information technology, that all of a sudden, we were going to go press questions the following morning. And in fact, Josh Benaloh from my squad and I sat at the back of the room and wrote a four-page Q and A for all the folks dorsum at Microsoft to sympathize what this meant for our products and services going forward. We transitioned to the next hash part that we had, which we called SHA-1. But SHA-1 shared some structural properties, similarities, with MD-five, and we figured that it would only be time until SHA-1 fell. And in fact, in March of concluding yr, Mark Stevens at CWI in kingdom of the netherlands demonstrated a SHA-i hash collision. And now SHA-1 of course has been broken the same way MD-5 has.

Host: Talk a piffling bit about how you go virtually attacking your own stuff.

Brian LaMacchia: Well, kickoff off, nosotros assume that everything we do is out in the open up. And this is sort of a primal matter for my grouping now. The algorithms themselves are open and published. The lawmaking that we ship is open source and available. And from a theoretical perspective, we assume that the attacker has access to all cognition about the algorithm and the lawmaking and the construction. And the only matter they don't have access to is the secret piece of the key.

Host: Primal.

Brian LaMacchia: Okay, and then when we try to set on our own algorithms, we're hopefully using the same ready of information and it's, how can we deduce the secret central without knowing information technology? That's function of the assay and thinking up new techniques and trying them out and trying to go toll estimates for what's doable if you have a cloud-computing infrastructure at your back, and, yous know, what would it cost to break something of a item size?

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Host: Well, let's move onto quantum. This is a big topic, and it's basically what you've been talking most for quite a while: life in a postquantum world. And that's still a ways out, but equally they say in the moving-picture show industry, it'south coming to a screen near you.

Brian LaMacchia: That's right.

Host: Maybe not your screen, merely somebody's. And besides, perhaps not right away. But let's talk nigh what breakthrough calculating is. I know we did a podcast with Krysta Svore who's "all breakthrough all the fourth dimension." And that was her perspective. I want to hear from a cryptographer's perspective. What is information technology? How is information technology fundamentally or materially different from classical computing, and why does it thing to researchers like you, Brian?

Brian LaMacchia: Certain. And first off, I should signal out that actually Krysta gave a great explanation of this during her podcast, and our teams actually piece of work together. We sort of dovetail with each other. But quantum computing is a fundamentally different model of computing. And from our perspective equally cryptographers, the key breakthrough in this really happened in 1994. That was when Peter Shor at AT&T Bong Labs invented a quantum factoring algorithm. That is, he demonstrated that if you had access to a big enough breakthrough computer, you could solve a problem in polynomial time. That is, you could gene in polynomial time, which we practise not know how to practise today or anything close to that, with classical computers. Now, Peter didn't take a quantum computer. We still don't really have large quantum computers. We have very tiny toy ones. But from existence able to demonstrate, theoretically, that if a new fundamental model of computation showed upwards, that it would change all of our assumptions, that'south still another case of how we have to constantly think virtually what an attacker has bachelor, and if the assaulter's resources all of a sudden change, that means they can do more. And then, from a cryptographic perspective, quantum computing is all the same another model of ciphering that opens up a different line of assail and a different set up of algorithms. And for a lot of the problems that we care about today, we know that quantum computers volition make the attacks faster. And for some of the types of cryptography we've talked about, there are easy mitigations. And for some of the things nosotros're using today, in that location aren't. And that's sort of what the concern is.

Host: You've talked nearly a "big enough" quantum computer.

Brian LaMacchia: Yes.

Host: Let's go there for a infinitesimal. What is big enough?

Brian LaMacchia: Okay, well for your listeners who might exist interested, we actually had a paper that appeared at Asiacrypt terminal Dec, 2017, working with members of Krysta's team on trying to come upwardly with precise estimates for how many logical cubits, logical quantum bits, yous need for "big enough." And what we mean by that is, when I retrieve nearly how hard it is to break a cryptographic algorithm, I talk about that in terms of, how big are the keys? What's the security parameter for the algorithm? And then, if I am typically doing RSA with 2-kilobit keys, 2048-fleck public keys. That is the module. This is the product of 2 primes of each of nearly 1024 bits. How long does it take to factor that? And that is well beyond anything we could do with, sort of, all the compute power we have bachelor to u.s. today. But what our paper showed is that if yous had just over double that number of quantum bits, just over 4096 quantum $.25 available in a quantum computer – and those are logical quantum bits that are stable – you can run Shor'south algorithm on it, and you lot can factor that 2048-bit number in polynomial fourth dimension. So, for the types of public key algorithms that nosotros are using today, if we're talking well-nigh factoring, typically your RSA keys are 2 to iv kilobits in size. And we demand double that number of quantum bits, plus a fiddling chip extra. Basically, from my perspective, things don't go interesting until there's at least i,000 logical quantum bits around on a quantum computer, and really upward to ten,000 logical quantum bits.

Host: And that is what y'all telephone call a cryptographically relevant quantum computer?

Brian LaMacchia: Quantum computer. Cryptographically relevant. And then, in our globe, if it'due south got say, on the club of 1,000 to ten,000 logical quantum bits, and you can program information technology, then it becomes cryptographically relevant.

Host: Now you're going to pay attention.

Brian LaMacchia: And not you lot've got to pay attention. That's where things get catastrophic for the public cardinal algorithms that we're using today. Or things get very interesting. Beneath that, there might be other interesting issues y'all can solve in chemistry, metallurgy, agronomics, things like that. Merely what I care about is upwards in the 1,000 to 10,000 quantum chip range.

Host: Let'southward say quantum does make it big and becomes cryptographically relevant sooner than we think. What's the practiced news and bad news about a big breakthrough in quantum computing, in your mind?

Brian LaMacchia: The bad news is, it means a lot of systems that nosotros use today have to get upgraded, and that the algorithms take to be replaced. And, pretty much, if you have or if you know that an antagonist has access to a cryptographically relevant quantum calculator, every normally used public key encryption needs to be replaced. The adept news is we've actually got a agglomeration of candidate replacements. This is work that my team'southward doing, other folks around the world are doing. And in fact, the US government is running a standardization activity right now to try to pick some new "breakthrough-resistant" public key encryption and digital signature algorithms. These are classical algorithms. You don't demand a breakthrough computer to run them. These are algorithms that run on classical computers, your laptop, my phone… They can run just similar RSA and Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve today. They're just based on different hard number theory problems for which nosotros don't believe there is a fast quantum solution. And an important indicate here is, we don't have any proofs correct now that the quantum-resistant algorithms that nosotros're all investigating are guaranteed to exist quantum-resistant. What we know is that there's no known breakthrough advantage. It's a trivial flake of a subtle bespeak, merely information technology'south important, that even for the new algorithms that we and other people effectually the world are investigating, we don't believe having a cryptographically relevant quantum computer gives y'all whatever advantage over having simply a cloud total of datacenter servers to assistance you. Just it's different than maxim, we are guaranteed that there is no fast quantum algorithm. That nosotros don't know yet.

Host: Right. Correct. Well, if nosotros situate ourselves in a postquantum globe and we're dealing with quantum-resistant algorithms, who has a vested interest in developing these, and who are the players at work hither? You alluded to that merely now. What'south the big picture, and who's all involved?

Brian LaMacchia: So, there'southward who'due south designing them and and so who uses them. And if you think about who uses them, well, it's anybody who ships an implementation of a cryptographic library or, you lot know, within of an operating organisation or a device. Everyone who's trying to open a secure channel, a secure communications channel over the net. You need to able to authenticate the party at the other finish, and y'all demand to exist able to institute an encrypted channel and send encrypted information back and forth. That's only common practice, right? And equally more and more of our communications are happening on the cyberspace in general, we want all those to be encrypted and private. And so, everybody who is involved in shipping code like that, one way or the other, is going to be a customer of quantum-resistant algorithms. Who's developing it? Information technology's academic researchers and industry researchers, cryptographers effectually the earth. My team'south currently working on 4 different algorithms right now, and each of them is an international collaboration where we accept researchers from industry and academia participating with the states on each of those four. And they're different sets. And y'all know, at that place'south some people that are working on i algorithm with us, and some on another. And these algorithms take unlike pros and cons, when compared. Some are faster than others, some have smaller key sizes than others. They have dissimilar engineering properties. And information technology'southward not clear it'south a 1-size-fits-all sort of matter. My judge is that when the US government standardizes these in, hopefully, five years, they'll actually cull a scattering of encryption and digital signature algorithms for different apply cases, considering what you want to fit into that smart light switch in your phone that you don't want to be taken over by somebody, is very different than what you're going to become put into your laptop.

Host: Well, allow's talk about that issue right in that location, the US government, among other governments. There'south a competition going on that I would love for yous to tell us about and what it involves and what the purpose of it is.

Brian LaMacchia: Sure. So, in 2015, NSA, for a decade, had been advancing the employ of elliptic bend public key applied science every bit office of a suite of commercially-available algorithms, that they called Suite B, every bit opposed to Suite A, which were classified algorithms, that they encouraged manufacture to ship to encounter the needs of the US Department of Defense to protect upward to top-surreptitious-level information. NSA came out in 2015, and said, "By the way, if you haven't finished the motility to elliptic bend cryptography, you should save your development cycles, because we're going to tell you to move to something quantum-resistant in the not-too-afar hereafter." That caused the U.s.a. National Institutes of Standards in Technology, or NIST, which is the standard-setting torso for the United States government, not merely DOD, for all government, to launch a standardization process, or a selection process, to come up with new algorithms. And NIST has led two very successful public standardization efforts in cryptography in the past, and so NIST has a history of running these types of competitions. And now they've launched this contest. And, in fact, my team is part of four submissions of I call up about 65 that made information technology in and are nevertheless active, although some of those have since been broken. And what happens now is we are all approved Round 1 candidates. And well-nigh this fourth dimension adjacent yr, NIST will announce which of those motion on to Round Two. And during this time, again, anybody'due south trying to cryptanalyze their own and everybody else's.

Host: Sure.

Brian LaMacchia: And to say what they can learn virtually it. And it's up to NIST to whittle it down, and we believe that then there will be a Circular Three, and that again, in nigh five years or then, they will denote some small subset of algorithms that volition be approved, some for public primal encryptions, some for digital signatures.

Host: To be implemented as the standard.

Brian LaMacchia: Equally the standard. They will make what'due south called a FIPS, a Federal Information Processing Standard, which is an official US Government standard. And so, what, certainly nosotros here at Microsoft, and others have encouraged us to do, is to then take that to an international standards organization such as ISO, and make it an international standard. Because nosotros really want, any comes out of this procedure, that everyone around the world has contributed their intellectual horsepower to, and has analyzed, you know, every bit much as possible, to go an international standard. Because you need international standards for interoperability.

Host: Absolutely.

Brian LaMacchia: We desire everyone to, basically, concord on potent, condom and secure algorithms. And then, the United states of america Government standardization is a stride in that procedure, only information technology's not the finish of it.

Host: And this is all aiming towards a mail service-breakthrough earth.

Brian LaMacchia: That'southward correct. This is all virtually getting algorithms in identify and then that, if and when cryptographically-relevant quantum computers get real, that we will take algorithms that we will already have transitioned to.

Host: So, let's talk about that timeline for a second. Realistically, I've heard, from you and others, that fifteen years maybe, optimistically, 15 years. Just why the fifteen-year workback plan? Why are you working on this now when you've got enough bug in a cloud-based world, and all the other things you've referred to?

Brian LaMacchia: Well, so that actually is the number I started with 2015. And what happened is I went…

Host: Oh.

Brian LaMacchia: Yep. I went to Krysta and her squad, because we had started seeing these signals, and I said, okay, when do y'all all remember that at that place'south a reasonable take a chance that we'll have a cryptographically-relevant breakthrough estimator? And at that fourth dimension, they were saying about fifteen years, which was 2030. Then, I thought, okay, 2030 is a long time away. And then you start thinking about all the things that you have to exercise between at present and 2030 to, effectively, upgrade the internet. Because that's really what you're talking about, correct? Y'all have to research new algorithms. Yous have to attempt to attack them. You've got to outset a standardization procedure. You've got to prototype them. You've got to do test deployments. Y'all've got to become them running on your ain infrastructure. You've got to upgrade all your customers using your software. And and then you have to turn off and decommission the things that will be broken. And when I look at how long it took united states, every bit an industry, to exercise that for the Doc-five hash function afterward Professor Wang's interruption, and I wait at how long it took to exercise that with the SHA-ane hash function, yous know, you add together the pieces up, you need about fifteen years. So, I didn't think nosotros were really starting too soon. I recollect nosotros were starting kind of correct on time, and I think nosotros're nevertheless well-nigh right on fourth dimension, if that 2030 number is all the same accurate. And it's good to see the progress that's being fabricated inside NIST. Just I'one thousand all the same encouraging people to try to move a little scrap quicker and to get-go taking our ain prototypes and outset deploying in exam environments to run across how flexible their software is to handle these types of algorithms. And you lot can do that today.

Host: So that leads united states of america into the concept of cryptographic agility, which we referred to earlier.

Brian LaMacchia: Yeah.

Host: Talk well-nigh what that is and why it's necessary.

Brian LaMacchia: Cryptographic agility, basically, is an architectural principle in your software, that where you lot use cryptography y'all practice non hardcode in a dependency on one or a small-scale number of algorithms. It's all virtually making information technology very piece of cake to reconfigure your software to employ something else, for a number of reasons. But everywhere that you accept dependency on a cryptographic algorithm, you want to make certain that you can very hands reconfigure information technology if, all of a sudden, somebody steps up and tells you that they tin break your hash part, you want to be able to quickly flip everything over to use another hash office. And if know that breakthrough computers are coming, and that we have to prepare for the post-quantum, globe, we want to make sure that all of our software that currently uses public key cryptography is designing in the ability to apply a quantum-resistant algorithm, even though we may non know exactly what that algorithm is withal.

Host: Or when they're going to need information technology.

Brian LaMacchia: Or when they're going to need it. But we can outset making sure that all of our systems have that agility today. And role of the reason that my squad doesn't merely practise the theoretical work, but we put out these loftier-performant, constant-time, side channel-resistant limitations is and then that we can actually integrate them into the commonly-used security protocols today and show how those algorithms would work, and that'southward why you can actually get run the common algorithms like TLS or SSH or VPNs with our postal service-quantum algorithms in the mix.

Host: Talk about this concept of, "record now, break later," or as you've phrased it, "tape at present, exploit later." Why should we be worried about somebody getting encrypted data that there's no way they tin unencrypt right now?

Brian LaMacchia: So, this is a real worry. In fact, it'south another reason why fifty-fifty without quantum computers existing today, you may want to deploy post-quantum right now. You have to presume that if you're sending sensitive data over a public network, that your adversary – whomever your antagonist is – will tape that information, has admission to the public channel. That'south why y'all're encrypting information technology in the showtime identify. Just data storage is cheap. Recording is cheap. And then, if you and I are communicating over an encrypted connection, nosotros have to assume that our mutual adversary is recording that traffic and storing it away for the twenty-four hour period in the future when quantum computers are real, and the adversary can come back and utilize the breakthrough reckoner in the future to learn about what you and I talked about on the encrypted channel today. Now, if we're exchanging recipes or something that nosotros don't recall has a lot of long-term secret value, that may not affair.

Host: Well, mine do.

Brian LaMacchia: Okay, well mine don't, okay? Merely, you lot know. Simply, permit's say that yous are a Nation-State, and y'all're sending information that's classified. And those things typically have, I understand, a thirty- or fifty-twelvemonth, or longer, time horizon, a security horizon. And information technology'south not just national government-level information. Allow'due south say that you're in the pharmaceutical industry and some of your research is going to have a 20- or 30-yr security horizon, considering that's the patent protection on the drug, or that you are in any industry where the data'southward got a long security horizon. If the time in which you demand the data to exist protected is longer than when we think quantum computers are going to show up, you have to presume that information's going to exist recorded and broken when an attacker has access to a quantum computer. And so, your protection horizon is truncated by the advent of breakthrough computers if you're just using classical algorithms. So, if you're trying to protect information for say fifty years today, you should be using a combination of the best classical schemes that nosotros have right at present, and a mail service-breakthrough scheme to endeavor to give you some protection beyond the advent of breakthrough computers. That'southward the safest thing. It's what we call a hybrid scheme, where you use the best classical schemes that we accept many, many decades of cognition virtually from studying, and add in some new protection.

Host: Well, let'southward say that does scare me and I want to have that mail service-quantum algorithm or breakthrough-resistant algorithm. Can I go it?

Brian LaMacchia: Yeah, in fact, all of these submissions to NIST, as part of the submission, everybody had to make open up source implementation available with their algorithms. In fact, your listeners can go out to GitHub, and they can become download all of our code, and yous can go become those libraries today and offset using them. And if you happen to be a customer of Open SSL, a very common TLS implantation, or Open SSH, or Open VPN, you tin can run that today. Nosotros fifty-fifty built a nice little sit-in device. Nosotros took a little raspberry pie and we turned information technology into a combination Wi-Fi hotspot and post-breakthrough VPN endpoint. Then, I can take that with me anywhere in the world, and it sets upwardly a VPN to a Linux machine running in Azure. That is my other endpoint. And I tin connect wirelessly to the hotspot in my hotel room, and I've got a post-quantum tunnel back to the Azure cloud.

Host: And all I've got is a Starbucks open, unsecured network.

Brian LaMacchia: You probably want a little bit more than that.

Host: I probably do, merely – aye, I should hang out with yous more. Speaking of the things that scare me.

Brian LaMacchia: Aye.

Host: You gave a talk recently that you subtly titled, How to Set for Certain Catastrophe. And that's a perfect setup for the question I ask all my guests, which is, is there anything that keeps you up at night?

Brian LaMacchia: Yeah, so the thing that keeps me up at night is that, say Krysta Svore and her squad are going to be successful sooner rather than afterwards. And by that, I hateful that we're going to meet quantum computers show upwards more than chop-chop than we anticipate, that the qubit construction challenges and the scaling bug will become solved by the very smart people working on them faster than nosotros can standardize and deploy defenses. In that location's this artillery race going on between the quantum computing folks who are trying to build the quantum computers, and the postal service-quantum cryptographers trying to make sure the defenses are out there earlier the quantum computing people are successful. That's what keeps me upwardly at night, simply it's a skilful problem to take.

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Host: How did you current of air up doing cryptography research? What was your path to MSR?

Brian LaMacchia: Information technology started as an undergrad at MIT. I was a co-op student at AT&T Bell Labs. And during my junior year, I took an undergraduate course in cryptography from Professor Shafi Goldwasser, who is at present a Turing Award-winner for her work with Silvio Micali in cryptography. And cryptography is this weird expanse of information science that is taking some of the purest mathematics and number theory and applying it to real-world practical privacy and security problems. And that was my jam. And, at the finish of the grade, I asked Shafi if she could recommend some people at Bell Labs who were doing cryptography for my next summertime assignment. And I was fortunate enough that she pointed me to Andrew Odlyzko, who was… turned out to exist my mentor for my master'southward thesis. And I did a couple summers and a master's thesis at Bell Labs, in breaking what were then called Knapsack Cryptosystems, which are no longer used, considering nosotros've, pretty much, broken them completely. But they were a type of public key cryptosystem that was existence studied at the time. And that led to graduate schoolhouse. Actually, my PhD was in artificial intelligence, and I went back to Bell Labs because they were looking for figurer scientists with an economic, legal or social bent to look at public policy computer science research. But the work I was doing was interesting to Microsoft, and I got recruited out into the product teams. And then got recruited into a group to become a cryptographic builder for some work we were doing on trusted computing very early on on. And in 2005, I ended upwardly over in corporate R and D, working on this niggling, what I call a security SWAT team, basically, for one of our former CTOs. And in 2009, we got reorganized into Microsoft Research into this new applied division, and that'south still kind of where I am. And I have a mix of researchers and engineers, you know, developers, program managers on my team. And everything that we do is both about furthering the academic field too as putting open source implementations of our algorithms and protocols out for anybody else to employ.

Host: Right. Well, and that'south a beautiful segue to… As we close, give some parting advice to researchers who are listening to this podcast, potential researchers… What might be on the horizon for them that you call back would exist skillful hard problems to work on, from your perspective, in this sort of math-intensive side of estimator science enquiry?

Brian LaMacchia: Well, hither'southward the easy softball one. If there's people out there that desire, that are interested in cryptanalysis, at that place's lx targets, very easy targets, in the NIST competition, for people to go do cryptanalytic piece of work. Because all of these algorithms are nether consideration, and the more nosotros know most something, the better. I of the reasons I would not recommend that we merely solely move to simply post-quantum algorithms today is that none of these algorithms have been studied equally long as, say, RSA and elliptic curve-based things. And then, that's why I actually recollect, for the first virtually decade of deployment, we're going to do hybrid schemes where nosotros'll use both. That probably means y'all finish up digitally signing things with two keys, one classical and one post-breakthrough. And then, in that location'due south a lot of cryptanalytic work there. And I recollect we're all the same learning about leakage, ways in which our implementations on software and hardware leak data that makes it easy to suspension. You're not breaking the mathematics. Yous're effectively bypassing the mathematics by inferring bits of a secret fundamental through physical properties of the device. And we have to utilise physical devices to work on this. And that's a very rich surface area. Another area that we're starting to do a little bit of work on, but I call back holds a lot of promise, is in formally verified implementations. And I think that'south a very rich expanse to doing work on within the cryptographic application space.

Host: And then, at that place'southward a lot of, still, fruitful areas of exploration and research?

Brian LaMacchia: Oh, absolutely. My team did some work back in 2008 and 2009 on distributed key management. And that'due south for, how do you share secrets securely amid, say, every machine and every rack in a datacenter, without having somebody plug a USB device into every motorcar manually? And there are some non-petty bug in that space. Key management of cryptographic keys is a very important problem, and it doesn't tend to get much attention as information technology should, and I recollect that's another fruitful space.

Host: I take to enquire yous one more than question.

Brian LaMacchia: Certain.

Host: How do you manage your passwords?

Brian LaMacchia: Perfectly fine question. I have a couple of, what I consider, very loftier-value passwords, which are all in my head. For all the typical website logins, I employ a password managing director, so that plugs into the browser. And then that is combined with a master countersign that unlocks that vault, and a concrete device that I plug in. So, I practice two-factor hallmark, and everybody should.

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Host: Brian LaMacchia, thank you for talking to the states today. It's been actually, really interesting.

Brian LaMacchia: Information technology'due south been my pleasure. Thank you very much for having me.

Host: To learn more than about Dr. Brian LaMacchia, and how Microsoft is working to ensure online security and privacy in a mail-quantum future, visit Microsoft.com/research.

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Source: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/podcast/cryptography-for-the-post-quantum-world-with-dr-brian-lamacchia/

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